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MISSOURI SECTION
tempted battery2 the specific intent required for aggravated assault
is a present desire to consummate a battery. But in the conditional in-
tent situation, the primary objective of the person making the threat
is to secure performance of a condition. This objective is manifested
by his forbearing to consummate the battery in order to give the
threatened party an opportunity to perform the condition and by non-
execution of the battery when the condition is performed. This delay,
when considered in the light of the objective, indicates that during the
time allowed for performance of the condition there is no present de-
sire to commit a felonious battery and therefore no specific intent0
Thus, it is submitted that the third view, adopted in the principal
case, which would allow the imposition of punishment for aggravated
assault, is erroneous inasmuch as conditional intent does not satisfy
the specific intent requirement. It would further appear that the
second view, which would allow a conviction for commonl but not for
aggravated assault, is the correct and more logical doctrine.
EVIDENCE-EX iRAJUDICIAL CONnSSION INADMISSIBLE WITHOUT
CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH CoRPUs DELICTI
St. Loids v. Waters, 289 S.W.2d 444 (Mo. App. 1956)
Defendant, after reporting to the police that he had been robbed,
confessed extrajudicially that the report was false and that he had
used the money which was said to have been stolen to pay bills. His
conviction of violating a city ordinance, which makes it a misdemeanor
to knowingly submit a false report of a law violation to a police officer
of the city,1 was based on his uncorroborated confession. In reversing
the conviction, the court of appeals held that since the corpus delicti
had not been established the confession could not be introduced as
evidence of guilt.2
29. State v. Morgan, 25 N.C. 186 (1842); Perkins, auprw, note 28, at 344.
'it. Intent has been defined more broadly than a desire to, accomplish a certain
result, For example, it has been said that advertence to a consequence Which wil
necessarily result from an act may also constitute intent. Cook, Act, Intention and
Mo fCe in the Criminal Law, 26 YAW L.. 645, 657-58 (1917). It is Submitted,
however, that the preceding analysis is in no way affected by the morebroadly stated definition. When an actor is waiting to ascertain whether his
demanded condition will he performed he surely can have no present advertence
to conseuences of an act for the simple reason that he has not yet acted.
311, It is to be noted in this regard that logical consistency would allow con-
viction for common assault only in those states where the unlawful placing of
another in apprehension constitutes that crime, see CLARK & MARSHALL, Cmzs
268-69 (5th ed. 1952). in those states where an actual intention on the part of
the actor to commit a battery is required for common assault, ibid., it would
appear that an adoption of the analysi suggested in this comment would logically
require that a conditional intent he held not to satisfy even the intent requirement
for common assault,
1, Sr. Louis RLv. Cons c- 46, § 23 (1948).
2. St. Louis v. Watters, 289 S.W.2d 444 (Mo. App. 1958).
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In order to protect an accused from convictions based entirely upon
untrue confessions, most courts have established a rule that an un-
corroborated extrajudicial confession will not alone sustain a convic-
tion.3 In a few jurisdictions, the required corroboration may consist
of any evidence which tends to support the trustworthiness of the
confession. 4 The great majority, however, have adopted a more strin-
gent rule requiring that the corroboration consist of independent proof
tending to establish the corpus delicti, i.e., the fact of the actual com-
mission of the crime charged.5 Theoretically, this rule could involve
proof of three elements: first, that a specific loss or injury occurred;
second, that the loss was caused by a criminal agency, rather than,
for example, an accident; and third, that the accused be identified as
the perpetrator of the criminal act.6 Most jurisdictions, however, in-
cluding Missouri/ consider the corpus delicti as encompassing only
the first two elements which, taken together, constitute the commission
of a crime by someone.8
3. Isaacs v. United States, 159 U.S. 487 (1895); State v. Capotelli, 316 Mo.
256, 292 S.W. 42 (1926); see Warszower v. United States, 312 U.S. 342 (1941);
7 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2070-71 (3d ed. 1940). The rule, in addition to pre-
venting the use of coerced confessions (State v. Capotelli, supra at 262, 292 S.W.
at 44), also protects those persons of unpredictable or unstable temperament,
defective mentality, extreme timidity, or those singularly ignorant of their legal
rights who, fearing the consequences of remaining silent, may revert to making
a false confession. See Note, 33 NEB. L. REV. 495, 503 (1954).
Professor Wigmore attributes the current restrictions imposed upon the
admissibility of extrajudicial confessions to an inheritance from England, re-
sulting from conditions prevalent in the British common law during the eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries, viz. (1) the character of the "lower-class" indi-
vidual charged with petty forms of property-crime, whose general attitude was
usually one of meek acquiescence to those in authority, regardless of the merits
of the case; (2) the over-cautious attitude of the transient Nisi Prius judges
who preferred to exclude the doubtful evidence in its entirety rather than suffer
the inconvenience of having to delay for purposes of subsequent consultation with
their professional associates; and (3) the common-law disqualification of the
accused to testify on his behalf or to have counsel. 3 WIGMORE, op. Cit. supra § 865.
This rule has been held to be equally applicable to extrajudicial admissions.
Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 154 (1954); Opper v. United States, 348
U.S. 84, 90 (1954); State v. Cooper, 358 Mo. 269, 271, 214 S.W.2d 19, 20 (1948).
For the distinction between confessions and admissions, see Gulotta v. United
States, 113 F.2d 683, 686 (8th Cir. 1940).
The corroborative requirement, however, is not applicable to an infra-judicial
confession, which is treated as a plea of guilty. See 7 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra
note 3, § 2071.
Where an admission is made prior to the crime charged, there need be no
corroboration. Warszower v. United States, 312 U.S. 342 (1941).
4. 7 WIGMORE, op. cit. supm note 3, § 2071.
5. Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147 (1954); Opper v. United States, 348
U.S. 84 (1954); State v. McQuinn, 361 Mo. 631, 235 S.W.2d 396 (1951); 7 WIG-
MORE, op. cit. supra note 3, § 2071. For a general discussion on the requirements
for corroboration of extrajudicial confessions and admissions, see Annot., 45
A.L.R.2d 1316 (1956).
6. McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE § 110 (1954); 7 WIGmORE, op. cit. supra note 3,§ 2072.
7. State v. Hardy, 276 S.W.2d 90 (Mo. 1955); State v. Fitzsimmons, 338 Mo.
230, 235, 89 S.W.2d 670, 673 (1935).
8. 7 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 3, § 2072.
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Evidence, which is offered to satisfy the rule that an extrajudicial
confession must be corroborated by independent evidence tending to
establish the corpus delicti, need not be excluded merely because it
would also tend to connect the accused with the crime; " nor does the
rule preclude use of evidence secured through exploitation of mate-
rial in the confession." Furthermore, the corroborative evidence
need not establish the existence of the corpus delicti either beyond
a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of proof." The corrobora-
tive evidence requirement means merely that the confession alone is
insufficient to sustain a conviction without some extrinsic proof
tendng to show that the confession is true and that a crime has
actually been committed.'- The general rule, which is followed in
Missouri/- is that once such extrinsic evidence is introduced, botk the
evidence and the confession may be weighed conjunctively in deter-
mining whether the corpus delicti has been sufficiently established?'
# People v. Franklin, 415 III. 514, 114 N.E.2d 661 (1958).
I(. See MOCOnmICK, Evn7Ewctn 233 (1954).
II, Davena v. United States, 198 F.2d 230 (9th C.), cert. denied, 344
U.S. 878 (1952); United States v. Kertess, 139 F2d 928 (2d Cir.), cefr.
deco 4, 321 U.S. 7905 (1944); Bollinger v. State, 208 Md. 298, 117 A.2d 913 (1955).
Htt we Conmonwealth v. Bishop, 285 Pa. 49, 131 Atl 657 (1926). For a dis-
russmn of the quantum of independent proof required, see Note, 103 U. PA. L.
Rsx("o-5 (1 9 5).
I?. See 2 WnARToN, CamxAtL EviwxcE 4 394 (12th ed., Anderson 1955).
That this rule also applies to extrajudicial admissions was pointed out by the
Supi one Court in Opper -. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 93 (1954), where it was
stated: "It is sufficient if the corroboration supports the esential facts admitted
sufficiently to justify a jury inference of their truth." (Emphasis added.) In a
similar, dccision rendered the ;same day the Court removed any previous uncer-
taintior regarding the amount of corroboration required for extrajudicial adnis-
sion, by equating the quantum of independent proof to that necessary for extra-judiei Iconfessions. Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 158 (1954). See also
Annot,, 91.) L. Ed. 110, 113 n.7 (1955).
IV3. State v. MceQuinn, 361 Mo. 631, 235 S.W.2d 896 (1951); State v. MeGuire,
327 TMo. 1176, 1183, 39 S.W.2d 523 525 (1931); State v. Skibiski, 245 Mo. 469,
463, 150 S.W. 1038, 1039 (1912). The rule that full proof of the corpus delicti,
mie iedently of the confession, is not required, applies with equal force to ad-
misslens, St. Louis v. Washington, 223 S.W.2d 858, 863 (Mo. App. 1949); Sft Louis
v. Simc, 223 S.W.2d 864, 869 (Mo. App. 1949).
14. eCXMicK, Evmw nc 230 n.6 (1954). The federal rule was stated in
Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 156 (1954): "All elements of the offense
must be established by independent evidence or corroborated admissions, but one
availalie mode of corroboration is for independent evidence to bolster the con-
fession itself and thereby prove the offense 'through' the statements of the ac-
cused," See also Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 98 (1954); Thompson v.
United States, 233 F.2d 317 (6th Cir, 1956).
In xegard to the order of proof, the general rule is that independent proof of
the corpus delicti should precede the introduction of the extrajudicial confession.
Note. 103 U. PA. L. REsv. 638, 657 (1955). It is not error, however, if the
trial judge exercises his discretion and allows the order of this presentation to
he i eversed, provided that sufficient corroborative evidence is introduced at some
later point in the trial. People v. McWilliams, 117 Cal. App. 732, 4 P.2d 601(1931) ; State v. Arndt, 143 S.W.2d 286 (Mo. 1940); State v. Thompson, 383 Mo.
1069, 64 S.W.2d 277 (1933); Taylor v. State, 191 Tenn. 670, 235 S.W.2d 818(195(), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 918 (1951).
After corroborative evidence has been introduced, it is for the trial judge to
rule whether such proof has sufficiently corroborated the confession and, if not,
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The instant case provides a unique illustration of how a strict appli-
cation of the independent corroborative evidence rule could work to
preclude the use of a confession to support a conviction even though
the defendant were guilty. The offense charged consisted of knowingly
making a false robbery report. Under an application of the preceding
rules, it becomes apparent that in order to establish the corpus delicti,
the city would have had to introduce independent evidence tending to
show that the report was false. 5 Dictum in the principal case sug-
gested that there were matters in the confession, such as the payment
of bills, which could have been investigated and which might have
furnished the necessary corroboration.o It is conceivable that, had
such evidence been presented, the court would have found sufficient
corroboration and thereby allowed the use of the confession, in addi-
tion to extrinsic evidence, to establish the corpus delicti. It is sub-
mitted, however, that unless the money had been marked or was other-
wise readily identifiable the mere fact that bills were paid would not
have provided sufficient corroboration, inasmuch as such evidence
would have very little if any probative value in tending to establish
that a crime had actually been committed. Furthermore, assuming
that the confession may not have contained any verifiable statement
which would have corroborated the "essential facts admitted,"'17 the
extreme improbability of being able to secure independent evidence
tending to show that the defendant was not robbed is obvious.
The difficulties facing the prosecution as a result of the rule re-
quiring independent corroborative evidence tending to establish the
corpus delicti have been obviated or compromised by other jurisdic-
tions in a variety of ways. In a few jurisdictions the guilt of an ac-
cused can be established by his uncorroborated extrajudicial confes-
sion.' 8 Some courts have held that the general rule applies to serious
to exclude the confession from evidence. Once the confession is admitted, how-
ever, the jury must determine for itself whether the corroboration has been suffi-
cient. It is obvious that the jury cannot find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt unless they also believe that a crime has actually been cqm-
mitted. 7 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 3, § 2073.
15. Considering the element of force required to consummate a robbery, it is
inconceivable that the defendant could have been robbed and not have realized
this fact. By similar logic, the absence of any such robbery could not pass un-
noticed by the defendant. Therefore, it appears that if the city proved that no
robbery had occurred, it would concurrently establish defendant's knowledge that
his report was false. Thus, that element of the corpus delicti which requires
proof tending to establish a criminal agency would be satisfied by proving that
no robbery had occurred.
16. 289 S.W.2d at 446. Defendant also had been shown pictures at the Bureau
of Identification and had partially identified a man as the one who committed the
purported hold-up. Cross-examination brought out that no investigation of the
man so identified had been undertaken. 289 S.W.2d at 445.
17. Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 93 (1954).
18. Commonwealth v. Kimball, 321 Mass. 290, 73 N.E.2d 468 (1947); Potrnan
v. State, 259 Wis. 234, 47 N.W.2d 884 (1951); United States v. So Fo, 23 Philip-
pine 379 (1912). It would appear that those courts which have disregarded the
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r ioi gh crimes, but that in cases of misdemeanors an uncorroborated
coatesion will be sufficient to sustain a convictien" In New York it
is provided by statute that a conviction for disorderly conduct may be
4ased upon an uncorroborated confession.- In addition, it has been
held that where an element of the corpus delicti consists of a negative
factr which is peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused, a con-
fession is sufficient to establish that factor,"
The problem presented by the principal case points to the necessity
of legislative and judicial re-evaluation of any rule which rigidly re-
quirvs corroboration regardless of unique elements of an offense that
might render corroboration virtually impossible, In this regard, both
the legislatures and the courts should give careful attention to the
suggestions offered by other states. For example, a legislature might
well enact a statute specifying that an uncoerced, uncorroborated con-
Cession would be sufficient to sustain a conviction when the circum-
stances of the offense would place upon the prosecution the burden of
ntroducing evidence tending to prove a negative element exclusively
within the knowledge of the accused. In light of the purpose of the
rult requiring corroboration, however, it is submitted that it would be
questionable whether such a statute should be made to apply to situa-
tions where it would be as difficult for the defendant to prove the
affirmative as for the prosecution to prove the negative, If the adop-
tion of such a statute is considered by the legislature, the primary
objective must be the achievement of a just balance between the in-
terest of the state in protecting accused persons from convictions based
upon untrue confessions and its interest in the efficient administration
of criminal justice which requires that the enforcement of the criminal
laws should not be frustrated by a rigid application of a rule of evi-dence.
rir hc rative requirement have done so in the belief that the credibility of an
Uncfle-'ed confesion outweighs the remote Possibility that it is untrume See $
WwoMo op, eit. sNrpra ncote 3, § $67.
Im.+t Commonwealth v. Quick, 15 Pa. Dist, 260, 1 Pa. Couty Ct. 4I (I9M);
State v. Gilbert, 36 Vt. 145 (186S) - of People v. Lowey,_Horffot & Ficher, Inc
186 K ie, 74,7 60 N.Y.,2d 145 (Majis, Ct, I94 ). In tngand, corroboration, i?
required at all, appears limited to caes of murder, b or offen involving
titl( to property. Rwoo, CmaKn , Exvmrs 38 (16t ed 1928),
2u. N.rCons or Cra. Paso § 901 (19W9), Peole, v. BrIcson, 171 Umc 937,
44, S XY.82d 997, 1005 (Magis, Ct. 1930),r~e9 om another pot, 283 N.Y
2W.fl 2S N.E.Zd 381, reargurnent Meid 8 NX. 774, 28 NXt7A 979 (1940>, The
@rnurt, in admitting the sworn confessio made by defendant bore the commis
smwer of Investigation, held that the contict between tb proviion and a general
,tatute which required evidence other than the confesson (see N.Y Co or Cant.
PPn. :305 (1 9)) was to be resolved in favor of the former.
,I, State v, Stone, 189 La. 567, 180 So. 411 (1938), cIt g I GBESNTr, Err-
WN(T § 70 (16th ed. 1899I; of. Jeneks v. United States, 2 FJ2A 540, 549 (5thCit PK>5) ; People v. Eiickson, swpra note 20.
Washington University Open Scholarship
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1956/iss4/7
